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EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
A Tool for Regulatory Research 
Charles R. Plott 
Regulatory research involves scholars in almost all dimensions 
of the social sciences. Economics, law and legal institutions, 
psychology, bureaucratic politics, and even voting politics be-
come intermingled in complex ways to obscure the conse-
quences of alternative policy options. Research undertaken to 
provide some insights, experience, or educated guesses neces-
sarily confronts scholars with multidisciplinary considerations. 
It also involves them with situations, problems, and institu-
tional arrangements for which there are no historical prece-
dents, leaving them with very little shared experience to 
resolve scientific disagreements. 
Within the last several years, both laboratory experimen-
tal methods and field experimental methods have been ex-
plored as a source of shared experiences and data for 
researchers and decisionmakers. The experimental technolo-
gy has been advanced, and perhaps more importantly, the art 
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of posing questions which make experimentation relevant is 
being developed. Scholars are beginning to see how experi-
ences generated from simple, special case, and controlled set-
tings can be used as criteria for determining the relative 
acceptability of general theories and related models of com-
plex social systems. Scientific thinking has shifted from an 
almost universal belief that exp~rimental methods are in 
principle not applicable when the questions involve politics or 
economics-to a qualified acknowledgment from several 
quarters that the methods are applicable when the problems 
are sufficiently simple and carefully defined. Occasionally, 
data from experiments systematically find their way into the 
policymaking process. The developments are in their infancy, 
and because of the structure and role of theory, they seem to 
differ somewhat from those that have developed within psy-
chology.1 However, progress is occurring as successful basic 
experiments provide a foundation for more complex applied 
work. 
Essentially two different types of experiments exist. Theo-
retically each seems best suited to accomplish a slightly differ-
ent task. The first, laboratory experimental methods, is very 
new to economics and politics. The capability of creating a real 
economic or political process within a laboratory environment 
was only recently acquired. The processes that can be created 
and sufficiently c~ntrolled are necessarily simple, relative to 
those that have naturally evolved. As a consequence the meth-
ods have been best suited for examining very basic and general 
scientific theories. However, the accumulation of basic results 
has led to the posing of more complicated questions, and re-
cently some direct applications of laboratory methods to regu-
latory questions have been completed. 
A recurrent theme in laboratory research is that models 
which researchers apply with great regularity to a wide range 
of complex processes should be expected to apply to the simple 
special cases of laboratory processes. If they do not, then they 
should be modified or rejected. Furthermore, those models 
which work best in simple cases have reasonable priority claim 
when applied to complex cases. It is by properly posing and 
sequencing arguments of this nature that the study of simple 
laboratory processes becomes relevant for the professions at 
-~~~.'ii:I~ii: 
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large. As such, a solid empirical basis for theory is being 
developed. 
The second class of experiments are field experiments which 
involve some perturbation and monitoring of a natural process. 
These studies (sometimes called "evaluation research") are 
generally more complex than laboratory experiments, and the 
research objectives are usually different from those of laborato-
ry studies. Many questions cannot yet be posed within a labo-
ratory frame of reference. Hypotheses regarding the 
development and evolution of institutions have not been suc-
cessfully formulated for laboratory study where the institu-
tions themselves are usually either held fixed or are treatment 
variables. Parameters or statistical regularities characteristic 
of large, diverse political and economic systems are not gener-
ally studied in laboratories. Field studies are usually designed 
to undertake such complex tasks and answer questions not an-
swerable by application of any other methodology. 
One major advance has involved the discovery of insights 
about how to properly identify research objectives so experi-· 
mental methods can be usefully applied. Five different types of 
research objectives will be demonstrated below: (1) theory re-
jection, (2) theory competition, (3) measurement, (4) simula-
tion, and (5) process design. The reader should regard these 
categories as an attempt to impose some structure on the liter-
ature in order to provide a coherent overview as opposed to 
any widely accepted methodological categorization. Any given 
experiment may reflect one or more of these objectives, and on 
occasion research objectives seem to make sense but still do 
not fit neatly into any of these categories. 
THEORY REJECTION 
Many models are applied to the behavior of complex political 
and economic processes. For the most part, scholars do not be-· 
lieve the models are "true"; instead they maintain that the 
models are "adequate representations" or "reasonable approxi-
mations" to the way things work. Unless such models have an 
internal logical inconsistency, critics will find it very difficult, 
if not impossible, to refute the position of an advocate who is 
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taking such a moderate posture. As a result, general models 
and theories of political and economic processes tend to die of 
old age, if they die at all-not because they are substantially 
at odds with the shared experiences of scholars. It sometimes 
takes decades if not more of painstaking scholarship to refute 
convincingly even the most ridiculous of theories. 
Experiments designed to reject a theory constitute an effort 
to speed up the scientific sifting process. The trick involves the 
art of designing a very simple process with the essential fea-
tures of the complex processes to which the target model is be-
ing applied. Models that cannot explain the behavior of simple 
special cases are not general models and therefore cannot be 
advocated as such. Furthermore, models that do not work in 
the simple cases, created explicitly to give a model its "best 
chance," can certainly be challenged as being relevant to the 
complex. Thus the idea is to create a situation so simple that 
reasonable accuracy of a model would be regarded by almost 
all to be a necessary condition for acceptance of the model at 
any level. 
If the model fails to work, then the model is rejected and the 
experiments have been useful. On the other hand, if the model 
actually works in the simple case, then the experimenter has 
really solved no problem at all. Critics of the theory will sim-
ply dismiss the experimental results, saying that the experi-
mental setting has nothing to do with the "real world." At 
best, they may be challenged to explain why the model of 
which they are critical might work in any context. On the 
other hand, those who support the theory will say that the ex-
perimental results simply conform to what was already "well 
known." 2 Thus experiments designed to reject theories may be 
"uninteresting" to everyone if the model intended for rejection 
actually works when given its "best case." 
Good examples of experiments of this nature were the early 
market experiments conducted by Vernon Smith. By applica-
tion of what has since been named induced preference theory 
(Plott, 1979; Smith 1976b), Smith created a very simple but 
very real market. One side of the market was allowed to 
purchase units of a commodity (called x) from the experiment-
er according to prespecified (marginal) cost schedules. These 
persons earned money by selling at a profit to those who want-
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ed to buy the commodity. A desire to purchase the commodity 
was created in another group of individuals by giving them the 
right to redeem with the experimenter any units purchased ac-
cording to a prespecified schedule of dollar amounts. Profits to 
individuals of this second group, which were theirs to keep, 
were the difference between the redemption value and the 
price paid by the individual. Thus for each individual, applica-
tion of the theory of derived demand establishes the existence 
of a personal demand function for the commodity. All transac-
tions were in cash and the magnitudes were sufficient to yield 
potential earnings substantially above the normal hourly rates 
of pay. 
The market was organized as a double oral auction. Bids, 
offers, and contracts were made publicly on a unit-by-unit ba-
sis. The market remained open for a short period and then 
closed. New redemption schedules and cost schedules were dis-
tributed (for the first experiments, these remained constant) 
and the market opened for a second trading "day." The process 
continued for several trading "days." 
The situation created by Smith was a very real market. It 
was a simple market relative to those found in natural envi-
ronments, but it was nevertheless real and the principles that 
are supposed to operate in markets in general should certainly 
be expected to be operative there as well. The market prices, 
volume and income distribution should all be predictable. In 
particular, the basic law of supply and demand should work to 
precisely and predictably determine these magnitudes. If in-
deed economists are unable to predict the behavior of a system 
as simple as this one, then their ability to predict and explain 
the operations of much more complicated, naturally evolving 
markets can be questioned. The early Smith experiments were 
certainly posed for an attack on an important and basic theory. 
The ability of the supply and demand model to predict the 
behavior of these simple markets is amazing. The data from 
four different experimental markets are shown in Figure 6-1. 
The market demand and supply functions are obtained from 
the traditional summation of the theoretical individual de-
mand and supply functions. After only a few periods prices 
converge close to the equilibrium price of $2.10. Volume is 
close to the predicted volume of eight units, and the efficiency 
122 
<I) 
-Cl.l 
..::,t. 
.._ 
11:1 
E 
c: 
0 
·.;:; 
u 
::J 
11:1 
~ ,_ 
0 
Cl.l 
:a 
::J 
0 
""0 
c: 
<I) 
Cl.l 
u 
·;:: 
a. 
c: 
0 
·.;:; 
u 
11:1 
<I) 
c: 
11:1 ,_ 
-
-0 
<I) 
Cl.l 
·;:: 
Cl.l 
<I) 
Cl.l 
E 
f.= 
,.... 
..b 
~ 
;::, 
~ 
i; 
A'ITACKING REGULATORY PROBLEMS 
N=t·~r· --~ a) ::J N "E ~ ~z c -~ I -~Ill ~~ • E 
:!:_ 1 "g ID8 ·;:; .. 
.n I t;.N !.~ a. 
" 
""' 
{ ~3~ 
N I V)~: 
N 
-u<t 
.;: 
• -~ & 1\: 
.. 
""' 
- 0 
c l -~ ~ 11. 
"i a. __ _::.,:...._ 
.. 
""' 
0 
N,... 
--COc 
.,.& 
~-~ 
cue 
0 
::J 
<tO 
~ 0 
d 
c: 
QJ 
E 
!!! 
a 
£ 
-2 
00 
c: 
·;:: 
.2 
tJ 
:J 
"<!:: 
"b c: 
c: .Q 
"' "' OQ.~
.s: E 
:g QJ 
·- c. c:o.s:: 
c :::: 
- ~ 
'. ""0 !!) QJ 
3C 
"' ·-QJ ~ 
<:<: c. 
QJ 
-;;;c.: 
'E vi 
C1l "' E ~ 
·.::c... 
QJ >-
c.-)( ·-
UJ ~ 
.. ~ 
"'·-c: c: 
.Q ~ 
]~ 
·.;: 0 
~>­
- ~ 
ODC!l 
.S z 
5_;,; 
·- ~ ti 0 
::I>-
< ~ 
""0 C1l ~z 
OD . 
c:""O 
·- :::1 
-o.s:: 
""0 ·-
·- E F< 
. > 
"' 0 
..0-"' 
" "' ~>-
. >-
-'.D 
C:-o 
0 Q) 
c: -~-:a ~ C1l 
-5~ §" 
.E ~ 
~.2 
C!l-u-<~:: 
~"b 
0 t:: 
<Jl "' 
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 123 
levels3 of these processes are near 100 percent. The data are 
representative of what occurs under a variety of different, 
shaped curves, shifting parameters, and in markets with ran-
domness and speculation. The model really works well. 
Until very recently, academic reception to this phenomenon 
was cool. Economists thought that only the obvious had been 
demonstrated. However, interest in the behavior of these par-
ticular markets has rapidly begun to revive as scholars seek 
explanations of the convergence phenomenon in terms of infor-
mation processing, signaling, information transfer, and there-
lated theories of strategy. We began to realize that we really 
do not understand why such markets nearly always converge. 
An experimental design that was first constructed as a tool for 
theory rejection is now being used as a tool to resolve competi-
tion among theories-a function which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The theories do not always win when given their best 
chance. Psychologists (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971, 1973; 
Lindman 1971; Slovic 1975; Tversky 1969) have developed a 
clever series of demonstrations that challenge the basic theory 
of preference as economists use it. Attempts by economists to 
modify the design or apply various economic theories to ex-
plain away the psychologists' results have failed so far (Greth-
er, Isaac, and Plott 1979).4 In addition to the study of pure 
choice behavior, a number of studies have been exploring the 
structure of people's risk-taking attitudes toward low-
probability, high-loss hazards (natural disasters, nuclear risks, 
and so on). Contrary to the traditional expected utility theory 
(Savage 1954), people appear to be willing to take risks in the 
domain of low probabilities, suggesting the existence of 
probability thresholds (perhaps larger), below which threats 
are ignored or discounted. Not only are these studies finding 
systematic exceptions to the expected utility hypothesis (Her-
shey and Schoemaker, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Schoemaker and Kunreuther, 1979), there apparently exist 
systematic deviations from Bayes law in the processing of in-
formation (Grether 1980). 
Exactly where these observations will lead is not clear. None 
of the above scholars are prepared to reject the entire expected 
utility frame of analysis and the related use of Bayes law. No 
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alternative theory does so well in such a broad spectrum of 
areas. It is clear, however, that the theory of choice and deci-
sion, when applied at the individual level of analysis, is in 
need of repair. The data from these simple experiments pro-
vide a common empirical frame of reference for those who wish 
to explore their own ideas about possible modifications of the 
theory. 
COMPETING THEORIES 
As mathematical tools increasingly find applications in politics 
and economics, the separations among theories grows finer and 
finer. Even though two or more models may make drastically 
different predictions about what might result from a particular 
policy or regulation, it may be impossible to discern from his-
torical data which is the more reliable model because the pre-
dictions of the models are usually similar. Experimental 
procedures are perfectly suited for this type of analysis. 
Consider a controversy about the implications of peak load 
pricing policies for residential users (Mitchell, Manning, and 
Acton 1978). On one side were those who claimed that electric-
ity users are characterized by ignorance, indifference, habit, 
traditions, and so on, and will not respond to a differential 
time-of-day tariff. Industry personnel and spokespersons with 
much experience and knowledge testified that their customers 
would not respond. Engineers with a great deal of technical 
expertise claimed that customers could not respond. On the 
other side were those who claimed that users would respond in 
a substituting manner typical of the optimizing postulates pre-
supposed in many economic models. In fact the history of elec-
tricity pricing had been so uniform over the years that 
overwhelmingly convincing evidence could not be generated in 
favor of one set of ideas relative to another. 
The natural thing to do was conduct a field experiment in-
volving the actual pricing policies of a company. The results of 
one such experiment are given in Figure 6-2 where peak-load 
prices were imposed on one group while a control group faced 
normal prices. As can be seen, the responsiveness to time-of-
day tariffs is dramatic, and the models motivated by 
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Figure b---2 Time-of-day and control-group load curves in 
the British experiment, average winter weekday loads, resi-
dential consumers, 1969-70 
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Source: J.G. Boggis, personal communication. Copyright Electricity Council of 
London. Used by permission. Reprinted in Mitchell, Bridger M.; Willard G. Manning, 
Jr.; and jan Paul Acton. 1978. Peak-Load Pricing: European Lessons for U.S. Energy Poli-
cy. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
noneconomic considerations were demonstrably less applicable. 
High prices at peak periods of demand shift the demand to 
other periods. Such results have been replicated by many other 
field studies and have been further refined to the specific type 
of rate, methods of metering, and so forth. 
Results from laboratory methods have also been successful 
in differentiating among competing theories. For many differ-
ent types of committees and circumstances the core of an ap-
propriately defined cooperative game model can be used to 
predict accurately the committee decisions (Berl et al. 1976; 
Fiorina and Plott 1978). Models that have historically been in-
tellectual competitors of this model are demonstrably inferior. 
The classic conflict between game theory and psychologically 
oriented theories of group processes is being placed in perspec-
tive. Within game theory itself the traditional game theoretic 
solution concepts that were the subject of mathematical game 
theory for years and remained essentially unchanged have now 
begun to be modified in light of experimental results (Laing 
and Olmsted 1978; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1978; McKelvey, 
Ordeshook, and Winer 1978; Plott and Rogerson 1979; Rapo-
port, Kahan, and Wallsten 1976). 
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Another example of competing ideas can be taken from mar-
ket theory. Different ideas about the relative revenue-generat-
ing properties of several methods of auctioning single items 
have existed side by side for years. With the application of new 
laboratory techniques for studying auctions, the ideas are be-
ing refined and their conflicts resolved (Belovicz 1979; Smith 
1967). More importantly, researchers have found observations 
generated by laboratory studies useful in formulating hypothe-
ses about the properties of very large and complex markets 
(treasury bills) and in ascertaining which market form would 
generate more revenue (Tsao and Vignola 1977). 
MEASUREMENT 
A third objective of experimentation involves measurement. 
Two very different kinds of measurement exist. The first con-
stitutes a check on the robustness of established results with 
slight changes in institutional parameters. The second is pa-
rameter estimation for general models. 
One of the most interesting aspects of laboratory experimen-
tal methods has been the discovery that slight institutional 
changes in organization can have dramatic changes in the per-
formance of the processes. The exact reasons for these influ-
ences are unknown and are frequently unexplained by the 
models that otherwise mirror the process behavior with rea-
sonable accuracy. 
A good example is given in Figure ~ 3. A price ceiling was 
imposed on a double oral auction market such as those dis-
cussed in Figure ~ 1. In both cases, the ceiling was nonbind-
ing, being at the equilibrium price in the experiment reported 
in Figure ~ 3 and $0.05 above the equilibrium price for the 
other experiment. Notice that the prices do not converge tight-
ly to the equilibrium, as is usual; instead, they hang below the 
equilibrium. Prices will jump immediately to the equilibrium 
when the ceiling is removed, as demonstrated in Figure ~ 4. 
Price floors exhibit the opposite behavior. 
Exactly why these phenomena exist is not clear, and exactly 
how they should be characterized can be debated, but they are 
not the only ones that have been discovered. One-sided oral 
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auctions tend to converge from above (below) when there is an 
oral bid (offer) (Plott and Smith 1978; Smith 1964). Price post-
ing has an independent effect. If sellers (buyers) post prices, 
then prices approach equilibrium from above (below). Efficien-
cy for posted price markets is low, and the adjustments of such 
markets to parameter changes is slow. 
Other institutional perturbations have been studied. Vernon 
Smith and his colleagues at the University of Arizona have 
been developing and exploring the behavioral properties of 
computerized markets. Isaac and Plott ( 1981b, forthcoming) 
studied institutions that permit the formation of conspiracies. 
Friedman and Hoggatt (1980) completed a definitive work for 
the cases of very small competitors interacting over a long pe-
riod of time. 
All these institutional variations can exert independent and 
measurable influences on market behavior. The results from 
some of these experiments were surprising and are not fully 
understood theoretically even now. Those interested in theory 
frequently begin with the simplest cases. The results from sim-
ple laboratory environments provide theorists with ample 
challenges. 
The second kind of measurement objectives are those intend-
ed to provide econometric measurements. Many economic mod-
els have broad policy implications, but the nature and 
sometimes direction of the implications can be sensitive to the 
parameters of the models. Several field experiments have been 
designed to provide information about the parameters of such 
economic models. 
Perhaps the first large-scale field experiment was an at-
tempt to measure the labor supply response that would result 
from a program of income maintenance. The motivation for 
this question was to help ascertain the possible consequences 
of a negative income tax program. An original experiment was 
conducted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania from 1968 to 1972. 
This experiment was followed by several others. A summary 
analysis (Keeley et al. 1978) evaluating the labor response to 
alternative nationwide national income tax (NIT) programs 
was published in 1978. 
Since the NIT experiments, attempts to measure responsive-
ness to other types of economic incentive programs have been 
Source: Isaac, R.M. and C.R. Plott, 1981a, forthcoming. "Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Experimental Examina-
tion." American Economic Review 71 (June). Reprinte~ with permission. 
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initiated. A series of experiments with health insurance have 
been attempted to measure the extent to which individuals' 
out-of-pocket payments will affect their use of the health care 
system and the extent to which differential modes of payment 
will influence health care.5 The results indicate considerable 
sensitivity of demand to the structure of coverage (Newhouse, 
Phelps, and Schwartz 1974). Measures of health status are also 
being developed (Brook et al. 1979). It is unlikely that health 
insurance policies will be developed without relying heavily on 
the results of these studies. 
Several other field experiments exist. Systematic measure-
ments of the responsiveness of housing supply and demand to 
assistance payments have been initiated with a goal of esti-
mating the likely effects of implementation at the national lev-
el. 6 The econometric work in the electricity pricing area has 
been so successful that the controversies about systematic re-
sponsiveness to price no longer exist. The issue has now been 
refined to one of systematic experimental measurement being 
funded and explored by the Department of Energy. 
In the environmental area, a "bidding game" is being ex-
plored as a tool to elicit individual preferences about environ-
mental variables (Brookshire et al. 1979; Rand Corporation 
1979). The willingness-to-pay measures are then employed to 
evaluate environmental conditions and alternatives. 
An important observation is in order about experiments 
designed to provide field measurements. For the most part, 
those interested in using the results of such field experiments 
plan to use the measurements as parameters in models that 
have broad policy implications. This means that the experi-
mental design itself must be developed to reflect the back-
ground economic theory. A great deal of theorizing is a 
necessary component of any such experiment, and the design 
should reflect this. 7 In addition, contingent strategies must be 
planned ahead in anticipation of at least some of the many 
things that can (and do) go wrong. 
The technology of designing, monitoring, and controlling a 
large-scale experiment is not easily mastered. Most papers 
published on the topic deal with methodological problems that 
were encountered during a project. Several experiments have 
terminated with conclusions only about how not to conduct an 
-------·-·-· - '~~------------
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experiment. Nevertheless the methodology has produced sub-
stantive results, and more are to be expected. 
SIMULATION 
When most people think about experimentation as applied to 
policy analysis, they think of simulation. A policy is going to 
be imposed on a social system. Simulations attempt to recreate 
a particular social situation on a smaller scale in order to pro-
vide decisionmakers with some experience of how such a situa-
tion might evolve. 
If there is no theory to indicate which variables are unim-
portant, the complexity of the small situation must mirror the 
complexity of the large as closely as possible. Furthermore, 
without theory to unify the observations, the experiment must 
be conducted enough times to assure the statistical "validity" 
of any asserted pattern in the results. Thus theory, even in the 
case of simulation, serves to simplify the experimental process. 
The more that accepted theory can be invoked, the less the ex-
perimental process needs to mirror the natural analog. The 
tendency of some scholars to reject experimental methods as 
irrelevant may reflect a basic interest in simulation. Such crit-
ics seem to be unaware of the role of theory, but they are 
aware of the complexities of the situation (and the impossibili-
ty of recreating it). 
Two attempts to apply new laboratory methods in· a policy 
simulation have been completed. The first involved the (poten-
tial) regulation of dry-bulk barge traffic (Hong and Plott, 
forthcoming). The question was whether barges should post 
their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
similar to many other rate-posting policies in the transporta-
tion industry. Laboratory markets were created that, from an 
economic theory point of view, were simply scaled down ver-
sions of the dry-bulk traffic market. Thus, theory played a key 
role. Demand statistics, relative size of market participants, 
cost factors, and demand cycles were equal (except for a scale 
factor) to the measurements for the 1971 industry. Market per-
formance was studied under the existing mode of organization 
(a telephone market) and the proposed mode of organization 
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(price posting). The inefficiency, inflating tendencies, and slow 
adjustment properties characteristic of posted-price laboratory 
processes were all replicated. The simple nature of the labora-
tory process allowed a major problem with price-posting sys-
tems to be clearly isolated and understood. And the results, 
when scaled up to market sizes, at least provided a crude 
model of what might be expected. 
In the second study using laboratory methods to analyze a 
complex and controversial policy problem (Grether, Isaac, and 
Plott 1979), the strategy of experimentation was not so much 
one of simulation as it was one of demonstration. The experi-
ments were used to demonstrate that accepted general theory 
would in fact work as claimed in laboratory processes that had 
the prominent features of a more complex process. 
Thus in both cases of "simulation" the role played by theory 
is critical. From a policy advocate's point of view these studies 
also involve a subtle but important change in the structure of 
the debate process. Those critical of the studies and related 
predictions must articulate a reason for the studies to be judg-
ed as wrong. With such criticisms in hand, however, the ana-
lyst can then examine them with perturbations of the original 
experiments. One simply conducts additional experiments for 
which the criticisms do not apply. Presumably at some point 
sufficient evidence is accumulated to support a decision. 
Field demonstration projects are not uncommon and are in a 
sense simulations, but they generally lack controls. When 
neither controls nor replications exist, one might claim that 
the methods are not experimentation. However, the lines of 
distinction are hard to draw in practice. A program that seems 
to lie right on the boundary between the two is the Experi-
mental Technology Incentive Program <ETIP) of the National 
Bureau of Standards. This program of administrative experi-
mentation has involved itself in a wide range of regulatory 
problems (regulation by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion of Western Union's public message service telegrams, re-
quirements by the Environmental Protection Agency for 
registering pesticides· and reducing regulatory lag, employ-
ment of postmarketing surveillance of drugs by the Food and 
Drug Administration). The ETIP explorations are reminiscent 
of a feedback control device for understanding the conse-
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quences of a particular ongoing policy at a particular time. It 
is an alternative to the traditional command and control strat-
egies that have been used in various forms to effect change in 
the process of regulation. And, the procedures themselves 
might be candidates as replacements for proposed rulemaking 
procedures. 
Once a policy has been established, a whole host of institu-
tional reactions are initiated as interested parties who were 
unknown at the outset reveal themselves through whatever 
political and bureaucratic means are at their disposal. The re-
searchers at ETIP are exploring methods of monitoring the 
state of policies, formulating feedback systems, recommending 
modifications of policies as vested interests and unplanned con-
sequences reveal themselves and documenting the experiences 
for those who are considering implementation of related 
policies. 
Other explorations with alternative forms of administrative 
structure exist. School voucher experiments involve studies of 
complicated administrative structures (Levinson 1976). An ad-
ministrative agency experiment was incorporated as part of 
the Experimental Housing Allowance Program. The idea in-
volved the use of different types of agencies in the administer-
ing of a program. Generalizations from these experiences are 
difficult because the small number of observations and large 
number of variables admit the possibility of many competing 
hypotheses to explain what was observed. Naturally, to the ex-
tent that controls exist, the number of competing hypotheses 
are reduced. 
PROCESS DESIGN 
The final objective of experimental methods is in a sense the 
opposite of the other objectives. Experimentation, and especial-
ly laboratory experimentation, can be used to provide experi-
ence with completely new modes of organization that have no 
"natural" origin. Such "synthetic" processes cannot be studied 
historically since none have ever existed. 
With the previously discussed objectives, an ongoing process 
is chosen, and the ultimate objective is to understand how and 
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why it (or slight variations of it) functions the way it does. 
Technically put, the objectives are sometimes to find a model 
(or mechanism) that reflects the essence of a process and will 
help predict the consequences of slight changes in the process. 
The design objectives are essentially the reverse. Designs are 
motivated by a mechanism (a mathematical model, a body of 
theory) that is perhaps completely devoid of operational detail. 
The task is to find a system of institutions-the rules for indi-
vidual expression, information transmittal, and social choice-
a "process" that mirrors the behavioral features of the mecha-
nism. The theory suggests the existence of processes that per-
form in certain (desirable) ways, and the task is to find them. 
This is a pure form of institutional engineering. 
Several examples exist in the laboratory experimental liter-
ature. Using abstract theory as a guide, Plott and Levine 
(1978) designed a class of agenda that are consistent with 
many aspects of Robert's Rules of Order but can be used to in-
fluence if not determine the decisions of voting committees. 
Another example is a series of papers that were stimulated by 
the literature on abstract adjustment processes found in math-
ematical economics. Economists, while exploring the mathe-
matical structure of a class of abstractly conceived economic 
processes, discovered that theoretical processes exist which 
solve the classical public goods problem. This problem consti- . 
tutes the core of theory about market failure where externali-
ties, pollution, or public goods are present.8 Vernon Smith 
(1978, 1979a, 1979b), using the mathematical models as a 
guide, designed a series of decisionmaking systems in opera-
tional terms and used laboratory techniques to explore their 
behavioral properties. 
Stimulated by the possibility of applying laboratory experi-
mental techniques, Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll (1979) and 
Ferejohn and Noll (1976) examined a problem faced by the 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). Independent stations face a 
periodic problem of selecting programs to be jointly program-
med and financed. Both the particular programs and cost shar-
ing must be determined within a single process. It is the 
classic problem of joint provision of a public good. The project 
undertaken by Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll involved tailoring 
processes suggested in the literature to meet the needs of the 
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PBS system. The properties and problems with these alterna-
tive systems are being evaluated by laboratory experimental 
techniques prior to the design of any field experiments or 
implementation. 
Some of the field experimentation and demonstration pro-
jects discussed might be described more accurately as having 
process design objectives. The voucher experiments, for exam-
ple, were clearly motivated by a body of theory about how a 
system of competition for students would work (Weiler 1974). 
The theory suggests that certain new systems will have partic-
ular properties; the experiment is designed to see if they do. 
SOME ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIMENTAL 
METHODS 
Experimental methods have some advantages over other re-
search methodologies. They provide an inexpensive means of 
obtaining experiences with the behavior of processes and the 
accuracy of models of those processes. Compared with histori-
cal techniques and econometric techniques, the expenses are 
low and the quality of the data is excellent. 
In addition, experimental studies tend to be conceived and 
executed quickly. Even the most complicated of social experi-
ments last only a few years. Laboratory studies, on the other 
hand, can be completed in a matter of months, if not weeks. 
Experimental methods allow a type of flexibility in situa-
tions that history frequently fails to provide. Situations can be 
created for which competing models give substantially differ-
ent predictions. Thus the opportunity is presented for using an 
empirical basis for pruning the theoretical tree of the less suc-
cessful models. 
Experimentation provides a type of practical advantage that 
might at first be overlooked but is extremely important. In the 
experimental world, everything must be operationalized. Ab-
stract terms (preferences, rights, strategies, information) that 
frequently serve as parameters on models must be specified op-
erationally. For theorists, this task is sometimes shockingly 
difficult and leads to the discovery of real ambiguities in the 
theory. The necessity for operationalization also tends to flush 
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out policy bugs that could spell potential failure for a political-
ly sensitive course of action. (A record form may be ambiguous. 
Instructions may be difficult to understand. Information that is 
obvious to policymakers may be too obscure to participants.) 
The small, unanticipated problems that can result from neces-
sarily incomplete planning and can cost thousands of dollars if 
discovered too late tend to show up in the experiment. The 
only cost at the experimental stage is that a relatively inex-
pensive experiment must be scrapped and redone. 
Some of the primary advantages of experimental methods 
are derived from the possibility of replication. Those skeptical 
of t.he results or those who do not trust the processors of the 
data can conduct the experiment themselves. In the physical 
sciences, replication of the results of others has developed as a 
standard and legitimate academic endeavor. Most researchers 
involved with laboratory methods in economics and political 
science replicate the results of others before relying on them in 
their own research. Those of us involved in experimental 
methods are always amazed by the variety of results that real-
ly do replicate in spite of the differences in subject pools, ex-
perimental settings, experimenters, and in some cases, 
experimental techniques. 
Not only is replication the vehicle through which experience 
with particular phenomena become shared, it is the process 
through which the competition among explanations gets re-
solved. Almost any feature of an experiment or unplanned 
event during an experiment can provide the basis for an expla-
nation of all the empirical results. Here are some typical ex-
amples: people did not understand the instructions; the subject 
pool was special; the number of participants or some important 
features of their lives (such as alternative job opportunities in 
a labor supply experiment) were not controlled; the incentives 
were not sufficiently large; the incentives were too large; the 
experimenter intervened to produce a "Milgrom" effect or the 
results are due to a "Hawthorn" effect. 
Such sources of competing hypotheses only become resolved 
through replication and modification of the experimental de-
sign. Until the experiment can be performed again with con-
trols for the hypothesized effects absent, the criticisms remain. 
Of course, a decisionmaker may decide that the evidence is suf- I j 
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ficient to justify an action in spite of the existing competing 
theories, but that is a matter of judgment. The nagging scien-
tific questions necessarily remain until the alternative experi-
ments are conducted. Controversial claims may take many 
experimental series to resolve and, for large-scale social exper-
iments, may be expensive. The point is that the conflicts are in 
principle resolvable and that the method of resolution fre-
quently involves more experiments. So, those thinking about 
the use of experimental methods as research tools should gen-
erally think in terms of a series (perhaps small) of experiments 
rather than only one experiment. 
It seems that one can learn nothing conclusive from experi-
mental methods about how naturally occurring processes will 
respond to various policies. Even in the physical sciences, ex-
perimental methods have not developed to that exalted state. 
It is clear, however, that one can learn much from experimen-
tation about models that purport to predict what will happen. 
And, one can get considerable experience with the operations 
of simple versions of the process. In other words experimenta-
tion can lead to informed guesses and, as our ability to proper-
ly pose questions improves, the methods will probably be 
applied with increasing frequency in many phases of regulato-
ry research. 
NOTES 
1. Similarities and divergencies in methodologies have not been 
systematically explored. Some excellent discussions can be found 
dealing with the methodologies that have evolved from psycho-
logically oriented studies (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Cook and 
Campbell 1976; McGrath 1964; Weick 1967), but currently none 
exist that deal with or attempt to summarize those which have 
evolved from an economics or mathematical political science ori-
entation. The only attempts are Kagel and Battalio (1980), Plott 
(1979), and Smith (1980). 
2. Psychologists mustering a defense against such claims have be-
gun to document a "knew-it-all-along" effect (Fischhoff 1975, 
1977; Fischhoff and Beyth 1975; Wood 1978). While the research 
purposes were not an attempt to muster a defense against such 
attacks the results certainly aid in that capacity. 
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3. Consumer plus producer surplus is maximized here if and only if 
the group maximizes the total possible earnings from the experi-
ment. This efficiency measure, first developed by Plott and 
Smith (1978), is now being used as a tool to evaluate the per-
formance of competing processes within laboratory experiments. 
4. It is interesting to note that these limitations to the economic 
theory of preference as applied to humans are being discovered 
by psychologists at the same time that the economic theory of 
preference is beginning to evolve as a general theory explaining 
psychological experiments involving the choice behavior of 
nonhumans (Kagel et al. 1975). 
5. For a summary listing of objectives, see Newhouse (1979). 
6. Ferber and Hirsch (1978) include a review. See also Carlson and 
Heinberg (1978) and Rand Corporation (1979). 
7. An excellent collection of papers on this topic can be found in 
Aigner and Morris (1979). See also Barnett and Lowry (1979) for 
a summary of results. 
8. For a review of the nature of the discovery, see Public Choice 
(1977). 
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